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Abstract - - In  this note, we study equivalence between symmetric duality in quadratic program- 
ming and matrix games. In particular, we obtain two different zero-sum games (a symmetric game 
and a nonsymmetric game) whose Nash equilibria correspond to the solutions of pairs of quadratic 
primal-dual problems. @ 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Dorn [1] gave a symmetric duality theorem for quadratic programs while Dantzig et aL [2] and 
Mond [3] formulated a pair of symmetric dual programs involving a scalar function f(x, y), 
x E R n, y E R m, under the condition that f(., y) is convex and f(x, .) is concave. Cottle [4] 
presented a slightly different pair of symmetric dual quadratic programs. A different pair of sym- 
metric dual nonlinear programs was given by Mond and Weir [5], which allows the weakening of 
the convexity hypothesis for f(x, y). Mond and Weir [5] and Chandra et aL [6] studied symmet- 
ric dual and symmetric dual fractional programming problems for pseudo-convex/pseudo-concave 
functions. 
In [7], some equivalence results between linear programming duality and a matrix game are 
given. For the infinite-dimensional case, similar results have been obtained by Tijs [8] for semi- 
infinite programming, and Forgo [9] and Underwood [10] for continuous linear programming. 
And also Chandra et al. [11] studied continuous linear programs and continuous matrix game 
equivalence. Chandra, Craven and Mond [12] presented analogues of results from [7] for certain 
classes of nonlinear programming problems. Kemp and Kimura [13] gave an equivalence theorem 
where the matrix game is not necessarily a symmetric game. In this case, the matrix game depends 
on primal and dual variables. Preda [14] gave analogues of Theorem 17 of [13] for a certain class 
of nonlinear programming problems, where matrix games depend only on primal variables. These 
problems are finite-dimensional nd satisfy certain generalized convexity requirements. 
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The purpose of this paper is to establish some equivalence r lations between symmetric duality 
in quadratic programming and matrix games. We present wo different zero-sum games whose 
Nash equilibria correspond to the solutions of the pair of symmetric quadratic dual problems. 
2. QUADRATIC  SYMMETRIC  DUAL ITY  AND 
MATRIX  GAME EQUIVALENCE 
A matrix game is defined by a real m x n matrix A together with the Cartesian product X x Y 
of all m-dimensional probability vectors X and all n-dimensional probability vectors Y. A point 
(2, Y) in X x Y is an equilibrium point of the game A if xA9 T < 2A9 T < 2Ay T for all x C X 
and for all y C Y and 2A9 T = v, where v is the value of the game. 
A game of strategy is described by its set of rules. These rules specify clearly what each person 
called a player is allowed or required to do under all possible circumstances. The rules define 
the amount of information, if any, each player receives. If the game requires the use of chance 
devices, the rules describe how the chance events hall be interpreted. They also define the time 
the game ends, the amount each player pays or receives, and the objective of each player. 
We denote by 2 and 9 the optimal strategies of Players 1 and 2, respectively. The optimal 
strategies have the following properties. 
(i) If Player 1 chooses 2, then no matter what strategy Player 2 chooses, Player 1 can get at 
least v. 
(ii) If Player 2 chooses Y, then no matter what strategy Player 1 chooses, Player 1 can get at 
most v. 
(iii) If Player i were to announce in advance that he planned to play strategy 2, Player 2 could 
not thereby take advantage of this information and reduce Player l's payoff. Similarly, if 
Player 2 were to announce Y, Player 1 could not increase his payoff. 
Now,  consider the quadratic symmetric dual programs: 
F(x,y) = ly  r Dy + lxT  cx  + minimize pTx, 
subject o Dy + Ax >= -b, (QP) 
x~0,  
] 1 
maximize G(u, v) = - -~vT  Dv  - 9uT  Cu  -- bT v, 
subject to --AT v + Cu >= -p, (QD) 
v~0.  
Here A is an m x n matrix; C, a symmetric positive semidefinite n x n matrix; D, a symmetric 
positive semidefinite m x m matrix; b, an m x 1 vector; y, v, m x 1 vectors; p, an n x 1 vector; 
x, u, n x 1 vectors. The entries of A, C, D, b, and p are constants, whereas those of x, y, u, and 
v are variables. 
The following lemma, which characterizes the optimal strategy of a certain type of matrix 
game, will be needed in the proof of Theorems 1 and 2. For the proof of this lemma, see [12]. 
LEMMA 1. For a matr/x game described by a skew symmetric matrix B, the value of the game 
is zero, and 9 is an optimal strategy for Player II (or I) if and only if B9 < O. 
Case I. A Symmetr ic  Mat r ix  Game 
We define the (n + m + 1) x (n + m + 1) skew symmetric matrix B(x, y) and study the relations 
between the primal-dual pair (QP) and (QD) and the matrix game B(x, y), where 
= o (DTy+b)  
xTC+p T y-rD+b T 0 
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THEOREM 1. Let (2, f]) be a feasible solution to both (QP) and (QD), such that  F(~, f]) = G(~, f]). 
Let z* = 1/(1 + y~j~j + ~-'~if]i), x* = z*~2, and y* = z'f]. Then (x*,y*,z*) soIves the matrix 
game B(ff:, f]). 
PROOF. 
we have 
By (1), 
From (2), 
Since (~, f]) is a feasible solution to both (qP) and (QD), and since F(2, 9) = G(2, f]), 
Df] + A2 _>_ -b, 
--ATf] + C~ >__ -p,  
• >o, f]>o. 
-A~ - Df] - b __< 0. 
ATf] -- C~ - p =< 0. 
Using (3), we see that f]TD~-~-~Tc~ _ _ pT~-t-bTf] ---- 0, which can be expressed as 
(2T C + pT) ~ + (f]T D + b T) f] = 0. 
Since x* = z*2 and y* = z'f], from (5)-(7), we obtain 
-Ax*  - (Df] + b)z* <= O, 
ATy * -- (C2 + p)z* <= 0, 
(2T c + pT) x* + (f]T D + b T) y* = O. 
But (8)-(10)imply 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
B(g', f])~'* =< O, (11) 
with ~* -- col(x*,y*,z*), where col denotes column vector. From (4) and the relations z* -- 
1/(1 + ~j  ~j + ~ i  f]i), x* -- z*2, and y* = z'f], we get 
x* => 0, y* _> 0, (12) 
+ + z*= 1. (13) 
j i 
Now (11), together with (12) and (13), implies by Lemma 1 that ~* is an optimal strategy for 
Player II in the matrix game B(~, f]). Since B(~, f]) is skew symmetric, the value of the matrix 
game B(~, f]) is zero and ~* is an optimal strategy to Player I as well. Thus, (x*,y*, z*) solves 
the matrix game B(~, f]). The proof is complete. 
THEOREM 2. Let (x*, y*, z*), with z* > O, solve the matrix game B(~, f]), where fc = x*/z* and 
f] = y*/z*. Then, (~,~) is a feasible solution to both (QP) and (QD), with F(~,f]) = G(~,f]). 
In addition, if there is weak duality between (QP) and (QD), then (~, f]) is optimal for both 
problems. 
PROOF. Let ~* = col(x*,y*, z*). Then, by Lemma 1, B(~,~)~* <__ 0, and thus, 
-Ax  * - (Of] + b)z* <= O, (14) 
ATy * -- (C~ + p)z* <= 0, (15) 
(~T C + pT) x* + (f]TD + b T) y* _-< 0, (16) 
x* _-> 0, y* >_- 0, z* > 0, (17) 
Ex ;  + Ey*  + z*= 1. (18) 
j i 
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Dividing (14)-(16) by z* > 0 gives 
D9 + A2 > -b, 
--AT9 -t- C2 _> -p,  
(Sc  + F )  2 + (gTD + b T) 9 < 0. 
(i9) 
(20) 
(21) 
Prom (17) and (18), 
:~>0, 9>0.  
Multiplying (19) by 9 and (20) by 2, we have 
(22) 
/jTA2 Jr- yTD~ => --,yTb, 
--E~TAT9 -F E;TcE? :> --2Tp. 
(23) 
(24) 
Adding (23) and (24) gives 
From (21), we see that 
From (25) and (26), we obtain 
xTc2 -F t?TD9 _--> --pT2 -- bTg. 
2Tc2 -F yTD9 ~ --pTx -- bTy. 
(25) 
(26) 
29T D~I JF I~T c2 -F pT ~ = --IgT Dg -- ~2T O2 -- bT g. 
Hence, (~, Y) is feasible for both (QP) and (QD), and the objective function of (QP) equals the 
objective function of (QD) at (2,9). This, with weak duality (refer to [4, Theorem 1]), proves 
that (2, Y) is optimal for both (QP) and (QD). The proof is complete. 
Case I I .  A Nonsymmetr ic  Mat r ix  Game 
Now we consider the matrix game associated with the following (n + 1) x (m + 1) matrix 
M(x,y): 
M(x,y)= yTD+b T x T (CTx+p) " 
THEOaEM3. LetP°  zo , = z o ,2=x° /z  ° ,9=y° /z° ,w i t /~z  °>0,z  °>0.  get 
(po, QO) be an equilibrium point for the matrix game M(2, Y) and p°TM(2, 9)Q ° = o. Then, 
(2, Y) is a feasible solution to both (QP) and (QD) with F(2, 9) = G(2, 9). If also weak duality 
ho/ds between (QP) and (QD), then (2, Y) is optimal for both problems. 
PaOOF. Since the value of the game is zero and (po, QO) is an equilibrium point, 
M(2,9)Q ° _< 0 and p°TM(2,9) --> 0. 
Hence, 
ATy ° -- (cS2 +p) z ° < 0, 
(gSD+bT) y° +(2TcT2+2Tp) z~ <=0, 
SA T + (gTD+bT)  z°_> 0, 
P*  ( -C  T2 - p) + (2 Tc  T2 + 2 Tp) z ° >= 0 
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But x ° _> 0, y0 => 0, Zl ° > 0, z ° > 0, and therefore, from the above inequalities, we obtain 
AT17 - -  cT% --  p < 0, 
yTD~ + bT17 + - '~TCTx  -F ~.Tp __< 0, 
Df] + A~ + b >= O, 
- -CTx~ "T -- p2 m -I- xTCTx  + ~,Tp => 0. 
(27) 
(28) 
(29) 
(30) 
From the nonnegativity of • and 17, (27), and (29), it is clear that (~, 17) is a feasible solution of 
(QP) and (QD). From (27), (29), ~ => 0, and 17 >= 0, we have ~TD17 + 2TcT2  + bT17 + 2Tp 2 0. 
Then, by (28), 17TD~ + ~TcT~ + bT~ + 2Tp = 0. Hence, F(2,17) = (1/2)17TD~ + (1/2)2Tc2 + 
pT~ = _(1/2)17TD17 _ (1 /2)2Tc2 _ bT17 = G(2, ~). When weak duality holds between (QP) and 
(QD), then (~, 17) is optimal for both (QP) and (QD). The proof is complete. 
THEOREM 4. Let (~, ~) be a feasible solution to both (QP) and (QD) such that F(~, 17) = G(2,17). 
Let 
z 0 _ i , z o = i 
1+ 2i 1+ 17j 
i=1 j=l 
,0 r zol qo r zol 
= L zO j ,  = L j .  
Then, (po, QO) solves the matrix game M(~, 17) and the value of this game is zero. 
PROOF. We have 
[~Z0] T T _cT~_p 
p°TM(x,17)Q°-~ [ z 0 j [17T;_}_b T :~T (cT~_[_p)] [ L z 0 ] 17z0 
[17 ° 1 : [z0~TA T _[_ Zl 0 (17TD..~bT) ,z0~T (__cT~__p) _~_ Z 0 (:~TcT:~ jr_ :~Tp)] Z 0 J 
0 0 [:~TAT 9 + 17rDi 7 + 5717] .Z 1Z 2 
Since 17 > 0 and A~ + D17 + b => 0, it follows that :2TAT17 + 17TD17 -F bT17 = (xTA T -t- 17TD 
+ bT)17 _>_ 0. But since F(2,17) = G(2, !7), we see that 17TDp = --~2Tc2 - -pT2-  bTfl. Therefore, 
2TAT17 + 17-FD17 + bT17 = [17TA -- 2Tc  -- pT]2 _>_ 0. On the other hand, since 2 >__ 0 and 
AT17 -- C2 - p __< 0, we conclude that [17TA -- ~Tc  -- pT]~ =< 0. Hence, p°TM(2,17)QO = 0, i.e., 
the value of the game is zero. 
Now the conditions of the theorem relative to (2,17) give 
AT17 -- cT:~ -- P ] 
M(~, 17)Qo = z o 17TD17 + bT17 + :2TCTx -~- 5:TP 
< 0, 
J 
p°TM(x,  17) = z ° [xTAT -F 17TD + b T, --:~TcT:~ -- E:Tp -[- :~TCTx Jr- :~Tp] ~ 0. 
Thus, (po, QO) is an equilibrium point for the matrix game M(2,17) and the value of this game 
is zero. The proof is complete. 
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